Western Development Company v. Arthur H. Nell : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1982
Western Development Company v. Arthur H. Nell
: Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gustin, Richards and Mattson; Attorneys for Appellants .
Unknown.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation





STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
a corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
— vs.— 
ARTHUR H. NELL and LORNA V. NELL, 
his wife, and LUELLA T. VOORHEES, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
D. S. BAKER, Defendant 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant and Respondent, 
and 
HENRY I. VOORHEES and AILEEN 
VOORHEES, his wife, and HILLARD 
VOORHEES and PEARL VOORHEES, his 
wife, 
Third-Party Defendants and Appellants. 
WESTERN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
a corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
— vs.— 
HENRY I. VOORHEES and AILEEN 
VOORHEES, his wife, and HILLARD 
VOORHEES and PEARL VOORHEES, his 
wife, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
D. S. BAKER, Defendant 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant and Respondent, 
and 
ARTHUR N. NELL and LORNA V. NELL, 
his wife, and LUELLA T. VOORHEES, 
Third-Party Defendants and Appellants. 
BEIEF OF APPELLAN1 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District 
in and for Sevier County, Utah 
HONORABLE JOHN L. SEVY, JR., Jui\)t\ 
k 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON 
Attorneys for. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
PREFATORY STATEMENT 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 9 
ARGUMENT 10 
I. The District Court erred in determining that Knight 
Investment Company reserved by Exhibit "B" (R. 79-
81) the oil and gas within Tract I above described 10 
A. Argument based on the assumption that the 
Court holds Exhibit "B" to be clear and un-
ambiguous so as to require construction thereof 
without resort to extraneous matters in determin-
ing whether the intention was to reserve oil and 
gas 10 
B. Argument based on the assumption that the Court 
determines Exhibit "B" to be ambiguous and to 
require resort to extrinsic matters to construe 
the same and to determine the intention of the 
parties thereto as to whether gas and oil were 
reserved 31 
II. The District Court erred in determining that Isaac 
D. Voorhees and wife conveyed to Knight Investment 
Company by Exhibit "D" (R. 85-86A) the oil and gas 
within Tract III above mentioned 34 
A. Argument based on the assumption that the Court 
holds Exhibit "D" to be clear and unambiguous 
on its face and to require construction thereof 
without resort to extraneous matters in determin-
ing whether or not the intention was to grant oil 
and gas 34 
B. Argument based on the assumption that the Court 
determines Exhibit "D" to be obscure and am-
biguous on its face and to require resort to ex-
traneous matters to construe the same and to 
determine whether or not the parties thereto in-
tended to grant oil and gas 36 
CONCLUSION 37 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS—(Continued) 
TABLE OF CASES 
Page 
Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co. (Okla. 1917) 167 Pac. 
468 30 
Barnard-Argue-Roth-Stearas Oil & Gas Co. v. Farquharson 
(Eng. 1912) AC 864, Ann. Cas. 1913B 1212 22 
Bundy v. Myers et al (Pa. 1953) 94 A. 2d 724, 2 Oil & Gas 
Rep. 352 30 
Carothers v. Mills (Tex. 1921) 232 S.W. 155 26 
Carson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. et al. (Ark. 1948) 
209 S.W. 2d 97, 1 A.L.R. 2d 784 22 
Clements v. Morgan (Ky. 1948) 211 S.W. 2d 164 26 
Coltharp v. Coltharp, 48 Utah 389, 160 Pac. 121 13 
Cornwell v. Buck & Stoddard (Calif. 1938) 82 Pac. 2d 516 23 
Deseret Livestock Co. v. State et al, 110 Utah 239, 171 Pac. 
2d 401 15 
Detlor v. Holland (Ohio 1898) 49 N.E. 690, 40 L.R.A. 266 24 
Dierk Lumber & Coal Co. v. Myer, 85 Fed. Supp. 157 13 
Easley et al v. Melton et al (Ky. 1953) 262 S.W. 2d 686 26 
Elkhorn Coal Corp. et al v. Yonts et al (Ky. 1953) 262 S.W. 
2d 384 26 
Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co. v. Right of Way Oil Co., 
(Tex. 1911) 137 S.W. 171 23 
Gordon v. Carter Oil Co. (1924) 19 Ohio App. 319 22 
Haynes v. Hunt et al, 96 Utah 348, 85 Pac. 2d 861 19 
Horse Creek Land & Mining Co. v. Midkiff, (W. Va. 1918) 
95 S.E. 26 22, 28 
Hudson v. McGuire (Ky. 1920) 223 S.W. 1101, 17 A.L.R. 148.. 20 
Huie Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co. (La. 1922) 
91 So. 676 21, 28 
Kentucky W. Va. Gas Co. v. Preece, et al (Ky. 1935) 86 S.W. 
2d 163 23 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS—(Continued) 
Page 
Long et al v. Madison Coal Co. (Ky. 1954) 125 F. Supp. 937, 
4 Oil & Gas Rep. 226 26 
McKinney's Heirs v. Central Ky. Natural Gas Co. (Ky. 1909) 
120 S.W. 314, 20 Ann. Cas. 934 20 
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. et al v. Strohacker (Ark. 1941) 
152 S.W. 2d 557 24 
Murphy v. VanVoorhis (W. Va. 1923) 119 S.E. 297 19 
Nephi Plastering & Mfg. Co. v. Juab County (1907) 33 Utah 
114, 93 Pac. 53 15 
Praeletorian Diamond Oil Assoc, v. Garvey (Tex.) 15 S.W. 
2d 698 23 
Prindle v. Baker (W. Va. 1935) 178 S.E. 513 13 
Rice v. Blanton (Ky. 1929) 22 S.W. 2d 580 15 
Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co. 
(Tex. 1913) 157 S.W. 737, 51 L.R.A. N.S. 268 28,29 
Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile Co. (W. 
Va. 1918) 17 A.L.R. 144 26,27 
Shell Oil Co. v. Moore (111. 1943) 48 N.E. 2d 400 21 
State v. Indiana, etc., Min. Co., 22 N.E. 778, 6 L.R.A. 579 24 
Suit v. Hochstetter Oil Co. (W. Va. 1908) 61 S.E. 307 27 
U.S. Kentucky Coke Co. v. Keystone Gas Co. (6 Cir. 1924) 
296 Fed. 320 26 
Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Cons. Mining Co. 
(1926) 69 Utah 423, 255 Pac. 672 15 
Vogel v. Cobb (Okla. 1943) 141 Pac. 2d 276, 148 A.L.R. 
774 29 
Williams v. Citizens Enterprise Co., 153 Ind. 496, 55 N.E. 
425 24 
Winsett v. Watson (Tex. 1947) 206 S.W. 2d 656 13 
Witherspoon et ux v. Campbell (Miss. 1954) 69 So. 2d 384 26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS—(Continued) 
TEXTS 
Page 
17 A.L.R. Annotation 156 26 
17 A.L.R. Annotation 164 29 
86 A.L.R. Annotation 983 26 
86 A.L.R. Annotation 987 29 
86 A.L.R. Annotation 987 19 
1 A.L.R. 2d Annotation 787 22 
37 A.L.R. 2d Annotation 1441 26 
37 A.L.R. 2d Annotation 1449 29 
37 A.L.R. 2d Annotation 1453-4 19 
16 Am. Jur. 527-8 12 
16 Am. Jur. 527, 528, 531, 580, 599 and 615 12 
16 Am. Jur. 533 17 
16 Am. Jur. 532, 533, 534 , 17 
16 Am. Jur. 537 28 
16 Am. Jur. 580 12 
16 Am. Jur. 599 and 615 30 
16 Am. Jur. 615 30 
36 Am. Jur. 303 30 
36 Am. Jur. 305 17 
Black's Law Dictionary, 1910 Edition, page 780 24 
Federal Leasing Act of February 25, 1920 9, 32 
L.R.A. 1918A Annotation 491 13 
Lindley, Mines & Mining, Sec. 87 et seq 27 
Oil & Gas Possibilities of Utah 16 
Plate II — "Oil and Gas Wells of Utah, 1891-1948" (Part 
of Oil & Gas Possibilities of Utah) 16 
18 R.C.L. 1093 27 
1 Summers Oil & Gas, Sec. 135 14,15 
STATUTES AND BULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) 11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
a corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
— vs.— 
ARTHUR H. NELL and LORNA V. NELL, 
his wife, and LUELLA T. VOORHEES, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
D. S. BAKER, Defendant 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant and Respondent, 
and 
HENRY I. VOORHEES and AILEEN 
VOORHEES, his wife, and HILLARD 
VOORHEES and PEARL VOORHEES, his 
wife, 
Third-Party Defendants and Appellants. 
WESTERN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
a corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
— vs. — 
HENRY I. VOORHEES and AILEEN 
VOORHEES, his wife, and HILLARD 
VOORHEES and PEARL VOORHEES, his 
wife, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
D. S. BAKER, Defendant 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant and Respondent, 
and 
ARTHUR N. NELL and LORNA V. NELL, 
his wife, and LUELLA T. VOORHEES, 
Third-Party Defendants and Appellants. 
Civil No. 
8293 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS ARTHUR H. NELL and LORNA 
V. NELL, his wife, LUELLA T. VOORHEES, HENRY I. 
VOORHEES and AILEEN VOORHEES, his wife, and 
HILLARD VOORHEES and PEARL VOORHEES, his wife. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
PREFATORY STATEMENT 
The Appellants named above are Defendants and 
Third-Party Defendants in two civil actions instituted 
by Western Development Company, a corporation, as 
Plaintiff, to quiet title to certain alleged rights, particu-
larly gas and oil, in lands described in its Complaint. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company, a corporation, herein-
after referred to as Mountain Fuel, Cross-Complained 
against Appellants in both actions, basing" its alleged 
rights on an Oil and Gas Lease from Plaintiff, Exhibit 
"N" (R. 113-116). 
Appellants Answered, raising issues as to the owner-
ship of oil and gas, and also Counter-Claimed against 
Plaintiff and Cross-Complained against Plaintiff's Les-
see, Mountain Fuel, as to Tracts I and I I I hereinafter 
identified, and sought thereby to quiet their respective 
titles to the oil and gas rights in said Tracts. After all 
pleadings had been filed, a Stipulation was entered into 
(R. 55-117), consolidating the two cases, admitting vari-
ous facts, and stipulating to such facts as being true and 
correct, which Stipulation incorporates and includes Ex-
hibits "A" to "0", both inclusive (R. 77-117). 
The consolidated cases were submitted to the Dis-
trict Court of Sevier County, Utah, on Plaintiff's Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment (R. 122-123), joined in by 
Mountain Fuel (R. 123) as Plaintiff's Lessee, and on a 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment made by Appel-
lants (R. 125, 261-262). By Order dated April 12, 1954, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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3 
the District Court denied both Motions (R. 263-4). 
At a subsequent hearing held June 11, 1954, none of 
the parties offered any additional evidence. After the 
submission of additional arguments and briefs, the Dis-
trict Court made its decision (R. 290-3) granting Plain-
tiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Ap-
pellants' Cross-Motion. Consolidated Findings and Con-
clusions (R, 294-324) and Consolidated Decree and Judg-
ment (R. 325-329) were entered accordingly. The in-
stant Appeal is taken from that portion of the Consoli-
dated Decree and Judgment quoted in Appellants' 
Amended Notice of Appeal (R. 334-336). 
The actions also involved numerous issues between 
Appellants and Mountain Fuel on one side and Defend-
ant D. S. Baker on the other side pertaining to purported 
Leases from Appellants to Defendant D. S. Baker, which 
issues were determined in favor of Appellants and Moun-
tain Fuel and against Defendant D. S. Baker (R. 322-
323). From such adverse judgment, Defendant Baker 
has not appealed or cross-appealed, the time for so doing 
having now expired. By virtue thereof, the District 
Court's determination is binding and conclusive as to 
Defendant Baker, and the issues involving him may now 
be ignored, which issues were the subject of a great por-
tion of the pleadings. 
Throughout this Brief, certain words or clauses are 
shown by us in italics for purposes of emphasis and are 
not italicized in any instruments being quoted. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The issues before the Utah Supreme Court are limit-
ed to a determination of the ownership as between Plain-
tiff and its Lessee, Mountain Fuel, on the one side, and 
Appellants on the other side of oil and gas in, under and 
upon certain parcels of land in the high mountain ranges 
of Sevier County, Utah, identified as Tracts I and I I I 
in the Stipulation above mentioned (E. 56-57), which 
Tract I is shown in brown color on Exhibit "Q" (E. 260) 
and which Tract I II is shown in red color on said Exhibit 
"Q".. 
In connection with said Tract I (Sections 4 and 17 
and the Northwest quarter of Section 9, Township 22 
South, Bange 4 East, S.L.M. containing 1440 acres), both 
Appellants and Respondents claim such oil and gas rights 
as successors in interest to Knight Investment Company, 
a corporation, which owned the fee simple title in and 
to said lands on and prior to March 29,1916. On that date 
Knight Investment Company made a Deed, Exhibit "B" 
(B. 79-81) conveying said Tract I to Isaac D. Voorhees, 
the predecessor in interest of the Appellants Henry I. 
Voorhees and Hillard Voorhees, which Deed contained 
the following reservation provisions: 
"Eeserving unto the said grantor, its succes-
sors and assigns all the coal, gold, silver, lead, 
copper and other precious and valuable ores, min-
erals, mines and mining rights. 
"Eeserving unto the said grantor, its succes-
sors and assigns rights-of-way for roads, rail-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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roads, telegraph and telephone lines, water pipe 
lines, depot grounds and grounds for building coal 
mine appurtenances of all kinds by paying there-
for to the party of the second part at the rate of 
Six Dollars per acre. 
"Reserving unto the said grantor, its succes-
sors and assigns the further right to go upon the 
surface of the premises herein conveyed, to pros-
pect for coal, gold, silver, lead, copper and other 
precious and valuable ores and also for the pur-
pose of making surveys for any and all purposes. 
"Reserving unto the said grantor, its succes-
sors and assigns the further right to any and all 
timber on the surface of the premises herein con-
veyed, except sufficient timber of aspen quality 
for corral and road purposes, which is hereby 
reserved to the party of the second part. 
"Reserving unto the said grantor, its succes-
sors and assigns the further right to any and all 
waters that may be developed through tunnels or 
other underground workings made or used by the 
party of the first part." 
Whatever title Isaac D. Voorhees obtained to oil 
and gas in said Tract I by virtue of such Deed now be-
longs to Appellants Henry I. and Hillard Voorliees as 
his successors in interest. Whatever title to oil and gas 
Knight Investment Company reserved and retained by 
said Deed in said Tract I is now owned by the Plaintiff, 
subject to its Oil and Gas Lease to Mountain Fuel. 
In connection with Tract III described in the Stipu-
lation (R. 56-57) and being parts of Sections 5, 6, 7, 8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and 18, Township 22 South, Eange 4 East, and of Sec-
tions 1, 12 and 13, Township 22 South, Eange 3 East, 
S.L.M., containing a total of 1280 acres, more or less, 
both Appellants Arthur H. and Lorna V. Nell and Luella 
T. Voorhees on the one side and Eespondents on the 
other side claim oil and gas rights as successors in inter-
est to Isaac D. Voorhees and wife. Said Isaac D. Voor-
hees owned the full fee simple title in and to said Tract 
I I I on and prior to April 3, 1916, on which date he and 
his wife made a Deed, Exhibit "D" (E. 85-86-86A) to 
Knight Investment Company, the predecessor in interest 
of Plaintiff and Mountain Fuel, its Lessee. Said Deed 
was a conveyance of specifically listed rights in and to 
the lands described therein, the granting clauses and the 
provisions defining the rights and items conveyed being 
in the following language : 
"WITNESSETH, That the parties of the 
first part . . . do grant, bargain, sell and convey 
. . . unto the said party of the second part, its suc-
cessors and assigns, all the coal, gold, silver, lead, 
copper and other precious and valuable ores, min-
erals, mines and mining rights lying or being in 
Sevier County, State of LTtah, to-wit: 
(particular lands described, including Tract III) 
"Together with rights of way for roads, rail-
roads, telegraph and telephone lines, water pipe 
lines, depot grounds and grounds for building coal 
mine appurtenances of all kinds, by paying there-
for to the parties of the first part at the rate of 
$6.00 per acre. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"Together with the further right to go upon 
the surface of the premises herein conveyed to 
prospect for coal, gold, silver, lead, copper, and 
other precious and valuable ores and also for the 
purpose of making surveys for any and all pur-
poses. 
" Together with the further right to any and 
all timber on the surface of the premises herein 
conveyed, except sufficient timber of aspen quali-
ty for corral and road purposes, which is hereby 
reserved to the parties of the first part. 
"Together with the further right to any and 
all waters that may be developed through tunnels 
or other underground workings made or used by 
the party of the second part." 
Whatever title to oil and gas rights Knight Invest-
ment Company acquired in Tract I I I by virtue of such 
Deed now belongs to its successor in interest, the Plain-
tiff herein, subject to Plaintiff's Lease to Mountain Fuel. 
Whatever title to oil and gas in said Tract I I I Isaac D. 
Voorhees and his wife did not convey by said Deed, Ex-
hibit "D", to Knight Investment Company now belongs 
to Arthur H. and Lorna V. Nell, his wife, and Luella T. 
Voorhees as his successors in interest. 
On and prior to December 23, 1920, Knight Invest-
ment Company was also the owner in fee simple of the 
South half and of the Northeast quarter of Section 9, 
Township 22 South, Eange 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian, 
described and identified as Tract I I in the Stipulation 
(E. 56) and shown in purple color on Exhibit "Q" (E. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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260) and of other adjoining lands, but on said date Knight 
Investment Company made to Isaac D. Voorhees a Deed, 
Exhibit "C" (E, 82-84), conveying said Tract I I to him, 
but excepting and reserving "all the coal, hydro-carbons, 
gas, oil, gold, silver, lead, copper and other ores or min-
eral products, with the right and privilege . . . in, under 
or upon the surface of the land herein granted, to pros-
pect for and mine coal, hydro-carbons, or any of the ores 
or mineral products herein reserved", and containing 
further reservation provisions along the lines of those 
set forth in Exhibit " B " (B, 79-81). As to said Tract 
II, Appellants disclaimed any right, title or interest in 
and to the oil and gas therein and thereunder, and all 
parties to the consolidated actions stipulated (E. 70) that 
the oil and gas rights within and under said Tract I I are 
vested in Plaintiff, subject to the rights of Mountain 
Fuel by virtue of its Lease from Plaintiff, Exhibit "N" 
(E. 113-116). Tract I I is not involved in any issues be-
fore the Court, except insofar as the Deed on it (Exhibit 
"C") helps disclose the intention of the parties in con-
nection with Exhibits "B" and "D". 
Tracts IV, V and VI are not involved in any of the 
issues now before the Utah Supreme Court. 
The following are matters of general geographical 
and historical knowledge of which we feel the Court may 
take judicial notice. 
All of the lands involved herein are located in the 
hig;h plateau or mountain area of Sevier County, Utah. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Prior to the dates when Exhibits "B" and "C" were made, 
March 29 and April 3, 1916, respectively, no oil of com-
mercial value nor any gas source or field worthy of the 
name had been discovered in Utah, no drilling of any 
nature for gas and oil had been conducted in either Sevier 
or Sanpete Counties or in the area of these lands or with-
in some 60 airline or 100 road miles therefrom, and all 
oil and gas drillings theretofore conducted in Utah had 
been in the low plateaus or swells, valley, river and desert 
regions of the state. Certainly it is true that in 1916 the 
development of oil and gas in Utah was not of any great 
consequence or in the minds of very many people. 
It was in 1920 that The Federal Leasing Act per-
taining to the leasing of Federally-owned Oil and Gas 
Lands was adopted (Act of February 25, 1920). This 
gave great impetus to the development of oil and gas 
properties and focused attention on oil and gas acreages. 
Any further pertinent facts will be developed in 
connection with the Argument set forth below. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. The District Court erred in determining that 
Knight Investment Company reserved by Exhibit "B" 
(B. 79-81) the oil and gas within Tract I above described. 
II. The District Court erred in determining that 
Isaac D. Voorhees and wife conveyed to Knight Invest-
ment Company by Exhibit 6iD" (it. 85-86A)the oil and 
gas within Tract III above mentioned. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 




THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THAT KNIGHT INVESTMENT COMPANY RESERVED BY 
EXHIBIT "B" (R. 79-81) THE OIL AND GAS WITHIN TRACT 
I ABOVE DESCRIBED. 
We submit that insofar as Utah is concerned, the 
matters to be determined herein are questions of first 
impression. 
A. Argument based on the assumption that the 
Court holds Exhibit "B" to be clear and unambiguous 
so as to require construction thereof without resort to 
extraneous matters in determining whether the intention 
was to reserve oil and gas. 
If Exhibit "B" is held to be unambiguous and is con-
strued on the basis of the Deed itself and from the face 
thereof, without resort to extraneous matters, then Ap-
pellants contend that such Exhibit shows on its face and 
by the language therein contained, construed in the light 
of March, 1916, conditions, that oil and gas were not 
reserved nor intended to be reserved thereby. The Dis-
trict Court, by originally denying both Motions for Sum-
mary Judgment, determined that the Deed was ambigu-
ous and that resort should be had to extrinsic matters to 
determine its meaning and the intention of the parties 
with respect to oil and gas. At a further hearing, how-
ever, no additional proofs were offered by anyone. The 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Motions for Summary Judgment were reiterated, re-
argued and briefed, and then followed the Court's deci-
sion favorable to Respondents. We submit that whether 
or not resort was or is had to extraneous matters, the 
decision should have been and should now be that oil 
and gas were not reserved by Exhibit "B". 
The Motions for Summary Judgment, made under 
Rule 56 (c), Utah Rides of Civil Procedure, require the 
Court to render a Summary Judgment "forthwith if the 
pleadings, deposition and admissions on file . . . show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a Judgment as a matter 
of law". Such Motion includes both phases stated above, 
that is, if the Deed is not obscure as to whether or not 
oil and gas were reserved thereby, then the question 
should be determined from the face of the Deed itself, 
but if the Deed is ambiguous as to oil and gas, then the 
question should be determined from a consideration of 
all pleadings and "admissions on file", including the 
Stipulation (R. 55-117). 
In either event, matters of which the Court may 
and should take judicial notice are to be considered, and 
in either event certain fundamental rules of law and 
particularly rules of construction are applicable. The 
crucial question is: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Did the parties to Exhibit "B", particularly 
the Grantor, intend to reserve the oil and gas in 
the property conveyed thereby? 
The intention of the parties, particularly that of the 
Grantor, is controlling, 16 Am. Jur. 527, 528, 531, 580, 
599 and 615. Eules of construction are a means to an 
end, being methods of reasoning which experience has 
taught will lead to intention. When such rules have been 
settled, it is the duty of the court to enforce them; other-
wise, titles are rendered uncertain and insecure. Such 
recognized canons in deed cases are either identical or 
closely analogous to the rules controlling in contract 
cases. 16 Am. Jur. 527-8. The problem is to determine 
the sense in which the words were used, not what the 
words mean in their technical sense. 16 Am. Jur. 580. 
In arriving at such intent, we submit that the fol-
lowing fundamental rules are applicable: 
(a) The question's to whether Exhibit "B" reserved 
oil and gas is to be determined by ascertaining 
the intention of the parties thereto at the time 
and under the conditions existing when the Deed 
was made. 
If oil and gas were reserved by Exhibit "B", re-
liance for that result must be placed on the words "other 
precious and valuable ores, minerals, mines and mining 
rights" in the clause reserving "all the coal, gold, silver, 
lead, copper and other precious and valuable ores, min-
erals, mines and mining rights", and particularly on the 
word "minerals". However, it is of primary importance 
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to note here that the reservation was not of "minerals" 
alone, but that such word was used with several general 
words following an enumeration of specific minerals and 
ores. 
The bare reservation of "all minerals" without any 
amplifying, explanatory or qualifying provisions indica-
ting some other intention, has been held quite generally 
to include gas and oil, but where other words used in 
connection with the reservation and other provisions in 
the deed show the true intention of the parties, any prima 
facie meaning of the term " minerals" must give way 
and the true intention must be effectuated. 
Any prima facie meaning must also yield to the 
intention considering the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the parties at the time the instrument was 
made. Coltharp v. Coltharp, 48 Utah 389, 160 Pac. 121. 
See Annotation, L.R.A. 1918A 491, which states 
that cases construing "minerals" as including oil and 
gas are not necessarily opposed to those reaching an 
opposite result as regards the particular instrument 
under construction, and that the words "minerals, mines 
and mining r ights" do not have an absolute definition 
when used in legal documents, it being necessary to as-
certain the intention of the parties to the instrument in 
which the term is used. Prindle v. Baker, 116 W. Va. 48, 
178 S.E. 513, 514; Winsett v. Watson (Tex.) 206 S.W. 2d 
656; Dierk Lumber & Coal Co. v. Myer, 85 Fed. Supp. 
157. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
In 1916 it appears obvious that the parties were not 
thinking in terms of oil and gas. There was no reason 
for them to consider such items. How, then, could the 
Grantor have been intending by Exhibit " B " to reserve 
items of which it was not thinking, particularly in view 
of the fact that no consideration was given to oil and 
gas in determining land values in the Sevier — Sanpete 
area. If the Court places itself in the position of the 
parties in 1916 and takes notice of any mutations in 
language, we feel the conclusion is inescapable that oil 
and gas were not intended to be reserved. 
1 Summers Oil & Gas, Section 135, contains an 
excellent discussion on the subject as to "When a grant 
or reservation of minerals includes oil and gas". I t is 
pointed out that when the Grantor, instead of using the 
words "oil and gas" uses the term "minerals", a question 
arises since that word is not a definite term and its 
meaning necessarily depends on the intent with which 
it is used. The following language is quoted: 
" I n a restricted and scientific use of the term, 
oil and gas are not minerals but hydrocarbon com-
pounds. I t is only in a broad sense, if all matters 
be divided into animal, vegetable and mineral, 
that oil and gas may be termed mineral,since they 
are neither animal or vegetable . . . From the fact 
that intention is . . . the controlling element . . . 
it is evident that there is bound to be much ap-
parent conflict of authority, some courts holding 
that gas and oil are, and others that they are not, 
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included. If, however, the cases are viewed from 
the standpoint of intention of the parties, they 
may be entirely consistent". 
Summers points out that the language of the in-
strument and the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the parties have led courts in a number of instances to 
conclude that oil or gas were not included in grants or 
reservations of minerals. Various cases to that effect 
are quoted by him under Footnotes 25, 29 and 35. 
In Rice v. Blanton (Ky. 1929) 22 S.W. 2d 580, 232 
Ky. 195, the court held there was no conveyance of oil 
and gas because of the wording of the instruments and 
also in view of the extrinsic evidence admitted to explain 
intention, even though the words "pipe lines" were used 
in the documents involved. 
Three Utah cases, to-wit, Nephi Plastering & Mfg. 
Co. v. Juab County, 33 Utah 114, 93 Pacific 53; Utah 
Copper Co. v. Montana - Bingham Cons. Mining Co., 
69 Utah 423, 255 Pac. 672; and Deseret Livestock Co. v. 
State et al, 110 Utah 239, 171 Pac, 2d 401, were cited by 
counsel for Kespondents in the District Court Arguments 
and Briefs, but we submit that not one of these cases is 
in point or any authority in the present situation. In 
addition, two of them were decided after 1916 and none 
had to do with the determination as to whether or not 
oil and gas were minerals within the terms of a grant or 
reservation. 
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In connection with determining the intention of the 
parties, in view of the conditions which existed in 1916, 
the Court's attention is directed by way of judicial notice 
to the publication "Oil and Gas Possibilities of Utah" 
compiled by Dr. George G. Hansen and to Plate II en-
titled "Oil and Gas Wells of Utah, 1891-1948", which was 
published in connection therewith and is a part thereof. 
This publication shows that the closest wells drilled in 
Utah to the area involved in the instant Appeal prior to 
1916 were in the Hanksville area of Wayne County, both 
being "dry" wells, and that a well was drilled in the Mt. 
Pleasant area of Sanpete County in 1918 which was also 
a "dry" well and was completed after Exhibits "B" and 
" D " were executed. 
Furthermore, a "dry" well was drilled at Ephraim, 
Sanpete County, Utah, in 1920 prior to the execution of 
Exhibit "C", and during 1920 it is a matter of common 
knowledge and judicial notice that there was a flurry of 
interest and excitement in the Redmond—Axtell area in 
Sevier and Sanpete Counties, Utah, concerning oil and 
gas, and a number of Oil and Gas Leases were taken. 
The well-drilling history of Utah prior to 1916 would 
certainly tend to show that the parties to Exhibits "B" 
and "D" had no reason to be thinking in terms of gas 
and oil in that year, particularly in view of the location, 
elevation and topography of the area covered thereby. 
There were reasons in 1920 to think of oil and gas, which 
explains the specific mention of those items in the 1920 
Deed, Exhibit "C". 
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(b) In determining the Grantor's intention, the en-
tire Deed and all of its provisions, clauses and 
context are to be taken into consideration, in-
cluding easements or privileges which help to 
show such intention. 16 Am. Jur. 532, 533, 534. 
36 Am. Jur. 305 states the rule as follows: 
"In determining what is included in 'miner-
/ als' as used in the conveyance, the term must be 
, construed in the light of the particular trans-
action and with reference to the nature of the 
instrument and its context, and where there is 
nothing else showing just what substances the 
••' parties intended to include by the language of the 
grant, the intention of the parties as to the extent 
of the minerals granted may be determined from 
the language of the mining rights granted as in-
cident thereto." 
16 Am. Jur. 533 states that in applying the rule, the 
court is not confined to a strict and literal construction 
of the language used where such construction will fru-
strate the intention of the parties, and that particular 
words and clauses will not be stressed. It is not sufficient 
to resort to isolated words or phrases. 
Before citing the case authorities we feel to be in 
point on this phase, we call attention to the language of 
Exhibit' 'B" which throws light on the intention: 
First of all, after enumerating specific items being 
reserved, the phrase used is "other valuable ores, min-
erals, mines and mining rights". Nothing is said about 
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drilling or boring rights or wells. The words "mining 
rights" help explain the items being identified and re-
served, and exclude oil and gas. 
Secondly, there is a reservation of rights-of-way for 
roads, railroads, telegraph and telephone lines, water 
pipelines, depot grounds and grounds for building coal 
mine appurtenances, no mention being made of easements 
for oil or gas pipelines, tanks, derricks, or anything hav-
ing to do with boring and drilling for or extracting and 
removing gas and oil. 
The next "reservation" paragraph reserves the right 
to "go upon the surface . . . to prospect for coal, gold, 
silver, lead, copper and other precious and valuable ores 
. . . " with no mention being made of any right to drill 
or prospect for oil and gas, of even minerals generally, 
indicative again of the fact that the parties were not 
thinking of oil and gas or intending to reserve the same 
but were thinking of ores and minerals of the type they 
listed. The reservation of timber also shows the Grantor 
was thinking in terms of mines and timbers for use there-
in. 
The next reservation is of water "developed through 
tunnels or other underground works" which would seem 
to eliminate water developed by the drilling of wells for 
gas and oil, showing again that Grantor did not have in 
mind the drilling of wells. 
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Every single easement and right reserved is con-
sistent with the conclusion that oil and gas were not 
intended to be reserved and is inconsistent with the con-
clusion that oil and gas were intended to be and were 
reserved. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the applicable 
rule in Haynes v. Hunt, et al., 96 Utah 348, 85 Pac. 2d 
861, wherein it has quoted the following language with 
approval: 
"A more modern rule and that now followed 
by the greater number of courts is that the whole 
deed and every part thereof is to be taken into 
consideration in determining the intent of the 
grantor, and clauses in the deed subsequent to the 
granting clauses are given effect so as to curtail, 
limit or qualify the estate conveyed in the grant-
ing clause." 
Courts in other jurisdictions have had occasion to 
determine the intent of the parties to Deeds in a number 
of cases involving recitations of easements and privileges 
inconsistent with or inappropriate to drilling for oil and 
gas and extracting and removing the same. Some of 
these are annotated in 86 A.L.R. 987 and 37 A.L.R. 2d 
1453-4. In Murphy v. VanVoorhis (W. Va. 1938) 119 
S.E. 297, the Court stated: 
"I t is apparent that the reservation for min-
ing rights is for oil purposes, and the right of 
ingress and egress, and of placing machinery on 
the lands for oil purposes. The reservation ex-
pressly so states." 
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The Court held that natural gas was not included in 
the reservation referring to minerals, even though 
ordinarily "minerals" would include both oil and gas. 
In McKinney's Heirs v. Central Ky. Natural Gas Co. 
(Ky. 1909) 120 S.W. 314, 20 Ann. Cas. 934, the Court 
construed the instruments as a whole and stated that 
if natural gas was in the minds of the parties at the time, 
it would be expected to find terms referring specifically 
to the rights and privileges necessary to its development, 
and "that the absence of such expressions, and the pre-
sence of other easements not applicable to the produc-
tion of natural gas, tended to show that it was not the 
intention that gas was to be included . . . If natural gas 
was in the minds of the parties . . . we would expect to 
find terms which would refer specifically to the rights . . . 
necessary to the development of it. We erect derricks 
and drill for gas and pipe it to market, but there was not 
a grant of a right to the use of timber in erecting derricks 
or of an easement for pipelines or with reference to the 
removal of machinery used in drilling." 
In Hudson v. McGuire (Ky. 1920) 223 S.W. 1101, 
17 A.L.E. 148, the words used were "all of the minerals 
(except stone coal), are conveyed with necessary right 
of ways and privileges for prospecting, mining and smelt-
ing." The Court held that while the word "minerals" 
generally is construed to include oil and gas, the addition 
here of "mining and smelting" required the introduction 
of extrinsic evidence to determine the intention of the 
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parties. This case discusses not only the point mentioned 
above, but covers very thoroughly the various rules and 
canons of construction referred to in the instant Brief. 
The Court's attention is respectfully called to that case 
in its entirety as being peculiarly analogous to our situa-
tion. In it the Court calls attention to the fact that the 
words "mining and smelting" have no place in the grant 
of oil or gas rights or privileges and that the use of these 
words, as well as the absence of suitable words to show 
that the oil or gas was intended to be conveyed, was 
sufficient to put a Grantee on notice that the grant did 
not include oil or gas. 
The Court stated in Shell Oil Co. v. Moore (111.) 48 
N.E. 2d 400, that since the intention of the parties is to 
be determined, it follows that anything in the Deed of a 
qualifying, limiting or explanatory nature may be con-
sidered. 
In Hide Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co. 
(La. 1922) 91 So. 676, the reservation of "the exclusive 
right to the iron, coal and other minerals" was held to 
exclude oil and gas where the following phraseology used 
was "all necessary privileges of mining on said land, 
and also the rights of way for rail and tramways for 
mining purposes through any portion of said land herein 
conveyed." The Court concluded that only solids, such 
as coal and iron were in contemplation, since nothing was 
said about boring, drilling or laying pipelines. 
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The case of Barnard-Arque-Roth-Stearns Oil & Gas 
Co. v. Farquharson (Eng. 1912) AC 864, Ann. Cas. 1913B 
1212, is authority for the conclusion that even though 
the reservation was of "all mines and quarries of metals 
and minerals, and all springs of oil in or under said 
land", natural gas was not reserved since the words used 
indicated that "minerals" was not used in the wide and 
general sense as including all substances not denominated 
vegetable or animal, and also since further words in the 
reservation stated that the Grantor reserved the pri-
vilege of "search for, work, win, and carry away the 
same", which words were not applicable to a thing of 
the nature of natural gas. 
Additional cases are annotated in 1 A.L.R. 2d 787 
following the case of Carson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad 
Co., et at (Ark. 1948) 209 S.W. 2d 97, 1 A.L.K. 2d 784. 
In Gordon v. Carter Oil Co. (1924) 19 Ohio App. 319, 
a Deed conveyed "all the coal and other minerals" with 
the right to enter on the land to make excavations, drains, 
etc., and with a right-of-way across the land "for the pur-
pose of transferring said minerals from the land." The 
court held that in view of the language used in the Deed 
and the circumstances and surroundings of the parties 
at the time, oil and gas did not pass under "other min-
erals," as such was not the contemplation of the parties. 
See also Horse Creek Land & Mining Co. v. Midkiff 
(1918) 81 W. Va. 616, 95 S.E. 26. 
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On the same theory, the Court in Praeletorian Dia-
mond Oil Association v. Ga/rvey, (Tex. 15) 15 S.W. 2d 
698, held that a Mineral Lease covering "oil, gas and 
other minerals" did not include gravel, since the Lease 
provided for the erection of derricks, tanks and pipelines 
but contained no provision for mining or disposition of 
gravel. 
The Court in Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co. v. 
Right of Way Oil Company (Tex. 1911) 137 S.W. 171, 
states that effect and meaning must be given to every 
part of the Deed and that the intent is deducible from 
the entire instrument and the language employed there-
in. To similar import is Kentucky W. Va. Gas Co. v. 
Preece, et al, (Ky. 1935) 86 S.W. 2d 163, in which the 
conveyance was "all the coal, salt, water and minerals 
of every description . . . and the right to use the land for 
the purpose of exploring, extracting, storing, handling, 
manufacturing, refining, shipping or transporting all 
said minerals." The Court held this conveyance included 
oil and gas because the rights granted in connection with 
minerals have particular application theerto. 
In California, the Courts state that oil may be re-
garded as a "mineral" if the word stands alone, but in 
Cormvell v. Buck & Stoddard (Calif. 1938) 82 Pac. 2d 
516, the Court held that the production of oil was not 
"mining" within the meaning of the California Code. 
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Dictionary definitions at and prior to the year 1916, 
including Black's Law Dictionary, 1910 Edition, Page 
780, did not refer to the extraction of oil and gas as being 
"mining." In addition to the California case, it was held 
in State v. Indiana, etc., Mm. Co., 120 Ind. 575, 22 N.E. 
778, 6 L.E.A. 579, and Williams v. Citizens Enterprise 
Co., 153 Ind. 496, 55 N.E. 425, that as ordinarily used, 
the term "mining" does not include sinking wells or 
shafts for petroleum or natural gas. Since the reference 
in Exhibits " B " and " D " is to "mining rights," it is 
evident that the parties did not intend to reserve in the 
one case, or to grant in the other case, oil and gas. 
The case of Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., et al., v. 
Strohacker, 152 S.W. 2d 557, 202 Ark. 645, analyzes vari-
ous cases in connection with the construction of reserva-
tions referring to "minerals" and emphasizes the neces-
sity of ascertaining the intent from the language used 
and the general circumstances existing. The Court refers 
to numerous other cases including New Jersey and 
United States Supreme Court cases requiring reference 
to the time when and the circumstances under which the 
Deed was made, and stating that a contemporaneous con-
struction is best and should be adopted. 
Detlor v. Holland (Ohio 1898) 49 N.E. 690, 40 L.E.A. 
266, involved a conveyance in which the language used 
was as follows: 
"Do hereby grant, bargain, sell, and convey 
to the said Michael L. Deaver, his heirs and as-
signs, forever, all the coal of every variety, and 
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all the iron ore, fire clay, and other valuable min-
erals in, on, or under the following described 
premises: . . . together with the right in perpet-
uity to the said Michael L. Deaver, or his assigns, 
of mining and removing such coal, ore or other 
minerals; and the said Michael L. Deaver, or his 
assigns, shall also have the right to the use of so 
much of the surface of the land as may be neces-
sary for pits, shafts, platforms, drains, railroads, 
switches, side tracks, etc., to facilitate the mining 
and removing of such coal, ore, or other minerals, 
and no more." 
The Court asked the question "Do the words 'other 
valuable minerals' include petroleum oil?" and then called 
attention to the fact that the Deed was made in 1890 
and must be construed in the light of oil developments 
as they then existed in the area, that Grantor was not 
shown to have any knowledge of the existence of oil in 
or near these lands, although oil was then produced in 
small quantities within from 10 to 20 miles, but there was 
nothing to show the parties had any knowledge thereof, 
that the incidents granted were all such as are peculiarly 
applicable to the mining of minerals in place, and not 
such as are in their nature of a migratory character, such 
as oil and gas. The Court further stated that nothing is 
said about derricks, pipelines, tanks, the use of water 
for drilling, or the removal of machinery used in drilling 
or operating oil or gas wells. After stating that the 
grant is to be construed most strongly against the Grant-
or, that the whole contract is to be considered to deter-
mine intention, that ordinarily "minerals" taken in its 
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broadest sense would include petroleum oil, and that if 
the easements granted had been intended to be applicable 
to producing oil, the parties would have used such words 
to express such intention, the Court concluded that the 
title to oil did not pass under the conveyance. 
The annotations in 17 A.L.R. 156, 86 A.L.E. 983, and 
37 A.L.R. 2d 1441, discuss the rule now under considera-
tion as well as the other canons herein cited. Other help-
ful authorities are Car others v. Mills (Tex. 1921) 232 
S.W. 155; U.S. Kentucky Coke Co. v. Keystone Gas Co. 
(6 Cir. 1924) 296 Fed. 320; Clements v. Morgan (Ky. 
1948) 211 S.W. 2d 164, and the following recent decisions : 
Easley et al v. Melton et al (Ky. 1953) 262 S.W. 2d 686; 
Witherspoon et ux v. Campbell (Miss. 1954) 69 So. 2d 
384; Elkhom Coal Corp. et al v. Yonts et al (Ky. 1953) 
262 S.W. 2d 384; and Long et al v. Madison Coal Co., 
(Ky. 1954) 125 F. Supp. 937, 4 Oil & Gas Rep. 226. 
The annotation in 17 A.L.E. 156 follows the case of 
Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile Co., 
17 A.L.E, 144, a West Virginia case in which the Court 
states that the term "mineral" is not a definite one cap-
able of a definition of universal application but is sus-
ceptible of limitation according to the intention of the 
parties using it, that in determining its meaning regard 
must be had not only to the language used but also to the 
relative position of the parties and the substance of the 
transaction. In this case the Deed granted "coal and all 
other minerals" and then went on to grant certain rights 
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ta be enjoyed by the Grantee in the production of such 
minerals, including the right to make and maintain "all 
necessary railroads, excavations, ways, shafts, drains, 
drainways, and openings necessary and convenient for 
the mining and removal of said coal and other minerals," 
and contained other provisions relative to hauling and 
transporting coal and other minerals. A number of cases 
and authorities are quoted, including Lindley, Mines & 
Mining, Sections 87 et seq., 18 E.C.L. 1093, and Suit v. A. 
Hochstetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317-323, 61 S.E. 307. The 
Court states that substantial aid is afforded by the lan-
guage used in the Deed in conveying said mining rights 
in determining what the parties meant by the term "other 
minerals," and states that the rights granted were such 
as are incident to the production of minerals by means of 
mines; that is, by shafting or tunneling. The West Vir-
ginia Court in the Rock House case cited with approval 
the decisions of the Court of Appeals of New York to the 
effect that the meaning of words used in a grant will be 
construed in the light of the language used in granting 
mining rights, and that where the mining rights are those 
involved in the ordinary processes of mining, the items 
granted will be limited to such things as are recoverable 
by such processes. 
All of the foregoing authorities support our conten-
tion that when the entire Deed, Exhibit "B", and all of its 
provisions, clauses and context are considered, including 
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the easements or privileges reserved, it is evident that 
the Grantor did not reserve nor intend to reserve the oil 
and gas rights. 
(c) In the construction of deeds, the rule of ejusdem 
generis shoidd be applied. If there is an enumer-
ation of particulars, followed by a sweeping 
clause comprising other things, the scope of such 
clause is restricted to things, within the descrip-
tion, of the same hind a,s the particulars enumer-
ated. 16 Am. Jur. 537. Similarly, the expression 
of a particular subject implies the exclusion of 
subjects not enumerated, or, expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius. As stated in 16 Am. Jur. 537: 
"If a deed covers particidar or express matters, 
the intention may be inferred to exclude other 
subjects which the general words of the deed 
may have been sufficient to include ..." 
In Huie Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co. 
(supra), the Deed reserved "the exclusive right to iron, 
coal, and other minerals . . ." The Court held that the 
rule of ejusdem generis required that the words "other 
minerals" following the specific terms "coal" and "iron" 
be construed as intending or including other minerals of a 
character similar to coal and iron, such as solids or min-
erals in place, requiring mining for their removal instead 
of drilling. To the same effect are the decisions in Right 
of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co. (Tex. 
1913) 157 S.W. 737, 51 L.E.A. N.S. 268, and Horse Creek 
Land & Min. Co. v. Midkiff (W. Va. 1918) 95 S.E. 26, and 
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the cases cited in the Annotations in 17 A.L.R. 164, 86 
A.L.R. 987, and 37 A.L.R. 2d 1449, to which the Court's 
attention is respectfully invited in connection with the 
instant point and the other rules cited. 
In Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil etc., 
(supra) where the Deed referred to ''timber, earth, stone 
and mineral," the Court held that under the rule of ejus-
dem generis, the word "mineral" should be applied to the 
same class as the particular words listed, that is, mate-
rials found upon land near the surface, as gravel and the 
like, and not "mineral oil" which is found at great depth 
and is of much greater value. 
If the parties to Exhibit "B" had intended to reserve 
oil and gas, they would have so stated, just as they did 
in connection with Exhibit "C" which was made nearly 
five years later in connection with an adjoining tract. 
In Vogel v. Cobb, (Okla, 1943) 141 Pac. 2d 276, 148 
A.L.R. 774, it was held, applying the rule of ejusdem 
generis, that ' 'water was not conveyed by a grant of the 
oil, petroleum, gas, coal, asphalt and all minerals of every 
kind or character" or a grant "of the oil, gas and other 
minerals in and under and that may be produced from" 
the land. 
In Exhibit "B" the case is clear for an application 
of the rules of ejusdem generis and expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius, since the general or sweeping clause 
follows an enumeration of particular items, from which it 
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should be concluded that the scope of the general clause 
is restricted to things of the same kind and character as 
the particulars listed, and that having listed these par-
ticular items of a particular type the intention must be 
inferred to exclude other subjects which the general 
words of the Deed may have been sufficient to include. 
(d) A Grant is construed most strongly against the 
Grantor when the language is ambiguous or 
doubtful, particularly in the case of exceptions 
or reservations. 16 Am. Jur. 599 and 615, 36 
Am. Jur. 303, and Bundy v. Myers et al (Pa. 
1953) 94 A. 2d 724, 2 Oil and Gas Rep. 352, in 
which the reservation clause read: 
". . . excepting and reserving, out of this 
land, the oil, coal, fire clay and minerals of 
every kind and character with rights of entry 
for the removal of the same . . ." 
The Court held that gas was not reserved, even 
though oil was specifically mentioned, along with " min-
erals of every kind and character." To the same effect 
see Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co. (Okla.) 167 
Pac. 468. 
As stated in 16 Am. Jur. 615: 
"Also, in virtue of the rule that a grant is 
construed most strongly against the grantor, when 
the language of an exception or reservation is 
ambiguous or doubtful, it will be construed in such 
way as to resolve doubts against the grantor in 
favor of the grantee, for the grant will not be 
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cut down by the subsequent reservation to any 
extent beyond that indicated by the intention of 
the parties as gathered from the whole instru-
ment." 
This follows largely because the Grantor selects his own 
words and the Deed is prima facie an expression of the 
intention of the grantor. 
In connection with Exhibit "B", the Knight Invest-
ment Company and its agents and officers selected the 
words to be used and indicated the items being reserved. 
The wording used, as indicated above, shows that gas and 
oil were not intended to be reserved, but if any ambiguity 
or obscurity exists, such ambiguity should be resolved 
against the Grantor in accordance with the foregoing 
rule. 
We feel that the fair and logical application of the 
foregoing rules of construction lead inescapably to the 
conclusion that if Exhibit "B" is interpreted on its face 
without resort to extrinsic matters of any kind, except 
such as the Court may judicially notice in construing 
said Deed, that gas and oil were not intended to be nor 
were they reserved by virtue thereof. 
B. Argument based on the assumption that the 
Court determines Exhibit "B" to be ambiguous and to 
require resort to extrinsic matters to construe the same 
and to determine the intention of the parties thereto as 
to whether gas and oil were reserved. 
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If, however, the Court determines that Exhibit "B" 
is obscure and ambiguous as to whether or not oil and 
gas were reserved, then resort should be had to the com-
plete Record on Appeal and to any items therein con-
tained to throw light on the intention of the parties. In 
this connection, it is pointed out that in December, 1920, 
the same parties made a third Deed, Exhibit "C", in 
which Knight Investment Company expressly reserved 
and listed hydro-carbons, gas and oil in addition to the 
same items and language previously used in Exhibit "B" 
in March, 1916. 
Exhibit "C" is admitted as part of the Stipulation, 
and certainly throws light on the intention of the parties 
in connection with the 1916 Deeds, since it discloses that 
in 1920, after the drilling of two wells in Sanpete County, 
Utah, after the adoption of the Federal Leasing Act of 
1920, and after a flurry of excitement concerning oil and 
gas in the relatively nearby Sanpete-Sevier area, the par-
ties, particularly Knight Investment Company, had in 
mind oil and gas and therefore expressly listed the same, 
as contrasted to the situation in 1916 when oil and gas 
were not listed and were not in the minds of the parties. 
The 1920 Deed is very helpful and significant, for 
in it the Knight Investment Company and its attorney 
and officers saw fit to include and did include a reserva-
tion of the same items as those mentioned in the 1916 
Deeds, but added three specific items: "hydro-carbons, 
gas and oil." 
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In this 1920 Deed the parties were thinking in terms 
of oil and gas and so showed. The fact that they used 
the specific words to describe them, at the same time 
using the words "mineral products" shows that they did 
not consider that such phrase "mineral products" in-
cluded oil and gas. They thus recognized that oil and 
gas were not included in the 1916 reservation and grant, 
because they had not intended to reserve them, and that 
to include them in the 1920 reservation it was not suffi-
cient to rely on the general term "mineral products". 
Parties intend to use the words that they do use, 
and they intend to use them for a purpose. In 1920 they 
intended oil and gas to be reserved and so stated. If they 
had been thinking in terms of oil and gas in 1916 and 
had wanted to reserve them in Exhibit "B" and convey 
them in Exhibit "D", they would have said so. 
What better act of the parties is there than the 1920 
Deed (Exhibit "C") to show that the parties did not have 
oil and gas in mind in the 1916 Deeds, Exhibits "B" and 
"D"? 
Furthermore, Exhibit " 0 " (K, 117) shows that the 
purpose of the Knight Investment Company under its 
Articles of Incorporation was in connection with "min-
ing, smelting, milling" and did not refer to drilling or re-
lated activities. 
All of the rules of construction listed above apply 
and should be given proper effect, even though the Court 
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determines that Exhibit " B " was obscure and that re-
sort must be had to extrinsic matters. In other words, 
those rules of construction should still be applied and 
should be coupled with resort to such other extrinsic 
matters as may be in the record and as may be pertinent 
to the inquiry in determining intention. 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THAT ISAAC D. VOORHEES AND WIFE CONVEYED TO 
KNIGHT INVESTMENT COMPANY BY EXHIBIT "D" (R. 
85-86A) THE OIL AND GAS WITHIN TRACT III ABOVE 
MENTIONED. 
A. Argument based on the assumption that the 
Court holds Exhibit "D" to be clear and unambiguous on 
its face and to require construction thereof without re-
sort to extrameous matters in determining whether or 
not the intention was to grant oil and gas. 
In contrast to Exhibit " B " which is the subject of 
argument under Point I above and which involves the 
construction to be placed on reservations contained there-
in, Exhibit "D", which is the subject of the instant argu-
ment, involves the construction to be placed on grants 
contained therein. Exhibit "D" was made under date of 
April 3, 1916, or five days after Exhibit " B " was made. 
By Exhibit "D", Isaac D. Voorhees and wife conveyed 
and granted to Knight Investment Company the items 
and rights listed therein, the wording being set forth in 
the above Statement of Facts (p. 4). I t is to be noted that 
the description of the items reserved in the one Deed 
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(Exhibit " B " ) is identical with the description of the 
items conveyed in Exhibit U D" , the properties involved 
being different, of course. 
It follows that the rights of the ^Respondents herein 
depend, in the case of the properties described in Exhibit 
" B " and involved herein, on whether or not Knight In-
vestment Company reserved oil and gas by that Deed/ 
whereas in connection with the properties involved herein 
and included in Exhibit "D", Bespondents' rights depend 
on whether or not Knight Investment Company was 
granted the oil and gas by said Deed. 
The same rules, canons, principles, and arguments 
set forth under Point I above apply to Point I I . In addi-
tion, however, we point out that in defining the rights and 
items being granted by Exhibit "D", the parties used the 
same language as that used by Knight Investment Com-
pany in connection with its reservations under Exhibit 
"B" . It appears clear that Knight Investment Company, 
therefore, was the author of both instruments. The par-
ties used the language they intended to use. The Knight 
Investment Company was interested in certain items, 
which it listed and defined in particular terms followed 
by general terms, again calling for the application of the 
rules of ejusdem generis and expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius. 
Here again, if Knight Investment Company had been 
interested in purchasing and acquiring oil and gas, it 
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would have been so stated. The grant was not of the 
fee simple title, with reservations of certain items as in 
Exhibit "B" , but was a grant of a limited and restricted 
number of items. Herein again, the mining rights, ease-
ments and privileges granted indicate the intention of 
the parties as to just what "minerals" were intended to 
be and were conveyed by Mr. and Mrs. Voorhees to 
Knight Investment Company. Exhibit " D " was a reten-
tion by Voorhees of their fee simple title, and a grant of 
"coal, gold, silver, lead, copper and other precious and 
valuable ores, minerals, mines and mining rights" and of 
easements or rights-of-way for roads, railroads, tele-
phone and telegraph lines, water pipe lines (not oil and 
gas lines or ivells), depot grounds, etc., by paying cer-
tain amounts, and of other easements, all of such a na-
ture as to indicate that the parties were thinking of the 
mining of hard or solid materials and not of the drilling 
and boring of wells or the extraction, storage, or removal 
of oil and gas. 
B. Argument based on the assumption that the 
Court determines Exhibit "D" to be obscure and ambigu-
ous on its face sand to require resort to extraneous mat-
ters to construe the same and to detemine whether or 
not the parties thereto intended to grant oil and gas. 
The arguments presented above in connection with 
Point I (B) apply with equal force and effect to Point 
I I (B) and for that reason are not repeated. 
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We urge upon the Court the conclusion that Exhibit 
UD" did not convey or grant oil and gas rights to Knight 
Investment Company, but served to retain the same in 
Voorhees, the predecessor in interest of the Appellants 
Arthur H. Nell, Lorna V. Nell, and Luella T. Voorhees, 
and that the District Court's decision to the contrary 
is erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
In connection with Point I, involving the construction 
to be placed on Exhibit "B", we respectfully contend that 
the parties thereto did not intend the said Deed to re-
serve oil and gas, and that such is true whether the Deed 
is construed on its face and without resort to extraneous 
matters or whether the Deed is held to be ambiguous and 
obscure on its face so as to require resort to the extran-
eous matters before the Court in the Record on Appeal 
in order to determine the intention of the parties to said 
Deed with respect to oil and gas. 
In connection with Point II, involving the construc-
tion to be placed on Exhibit "D", we respectfully submit 
that the parties thereto did not intend said Deed to grant 
oil and gas, and that such conclusion should be reached 
whether the Deed is construed without resort to extran-
eous matters or, on the ground that it is held to be ob-
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scure on its face, is construed in the light of the extran-
eous matters before the Court in connection with the 
Motions for Summary Judgment. 
For all the reasons hereinabove stated, the Appel-
lants request that the decision of the District Court be 
reversed and that Findings, Conclusions and Decree be 
entered in favor of Appellants on their Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
1% • 
GUSTIN, EICHAEDS & MATTSSON 
B y CARVEL MATTSSON 
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